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TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE FOR PRESS RELEASE OF 
LoWER FEDERAL OFFICER-Respondents, former employees of the Office of 
Rent Stabilization, brought a libel action against petitioner, the acting 
director of the office. The alleged libel was contained in a press release issued 
by petitioner in which he announced his intention to suspend respondents 
because of acts for which the office had been severely criticized by the 
Senate and press. The district court instructed the jury to find for plain-
tiffs if the release was defamatory. On appeal from judgment for plaintiff, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.1 On certiorari, 
the United States Supreme Court remanded for consideration of the ques-
tion of qualified privilege.2 The court of appeals then held that defendant 
was qualifiedly privileged but remanded to the trial court jury on the 
question of malice.3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
held, reversed, four justices dissenting.4 Petitioner was protected by an 
absolute privilege in issuing the press release, which was within the scope 
of his official duties. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).5 
Absolute privilege is a complete defense to defamation regardless of 
whether the alleged defamer is actuated by malice.0 This defense js made 
available as a matter of policy to certain government officials in the belief 
that it is in the public interest that such officials should be free from 
harassment and fear of law suits while performing their official functions.7 
The defense is not available for acts of these same officials done outside the 
performance of official functions.8 Historically it was applied to the leg-
islative and judicial branches of the state and national governments and 
to military and naval officers carrying out their military duties.o In the 
1244 F. (2d) 767 (1957). 
2 355 U.S. 171 (1957). 
3 256 F. (2d) 890 (1958). 
4 Chief Justice Warren dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Douglas. Justice 
Stewart and Justice Brennan each dissented separately. Justice Black concurred in a 
separate opinion. 
5 In the companion case of Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959), decided the same 
day, the Court ruled that a commander of a naval shipyard was absolutely privileged in 
sending a letter to his state's delegation to Congress explaining his action in revoking 
representation of a certain labor organization in his shipyard. The Court based its rea-
soning on the principal case. See 360 U.S. 593 at 597. 
6 3 TORTS R.IlsTATEMENT §582 (1938); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 629 (1955); 1 HARPER 
AND JAMES, TORTS §5.21 (1956). On the other hand, qualified privilege protects the 
author only as long as he acts in good faith without malice. See 3 TORTS R.IlsTATEMENT 
§599 (1938). 
7 ODGERS, LmEL AND SLANDER, 6th ed., 187 (1929), quoted in 1 HARPER AND JAMES, 
TORTS 420, 429 (1956). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 (1871); Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). 
B See, e.g., Colpoys v. Gates, (D.C. Cir. 1941) ll8 F. (2d) 16; National Disabled Soldiers' 
League v. Haan, (D.C. Cir. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 436; Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165 (1913). 
See also Murray v. Brancato, 290 N.Y. 52, 48 N.E. (2d) 257 (1943). 
9 On the privilege of legislative officials, see U.S. CoNST., Art. I, §6; Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See, generally, 
3 TORTS R.IlsTATEMENT §590 (1938). On the privilege of the judiciary, see Bradley v. 
Fisher, note 7 supra; Cooper v. O'Connor, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 135; Yaselli v. Goff, 
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monumental case of Spalding v. Vilas10 the Court extended absolute privi-
lege to the executive branch of the federal government in order to protect 
the Postmaster General in a libel action arising out of letters mailed to 
active and retired postmasters explaining a new statute. The Court felt 
the same policy considerations applied with respect to executive heads of 
departments as to the legislature and judiciary.11 If the rule of Spalding 
was intended only for the protection of policy-making heads of departments 
and Cabinet members,12 this limitation was short-lived, for lower federal 
courts and probably the majority of state courts have since applied it to 
various inferior executive officers.13 Extension of the availability of the 
defense has made even more difficult the task of determining the scope of 
official authority in the exercise of which a given government officer should 
be absolutely privileged. The cases indicate that statements made in official 
reports to superiors will be privileged so long as the statement is at all 
relevant to the report.14 Also, communications made by officers to persons 
other than those receiving official reports but to whom an obligation or duty 
exists to communicate, by virtue of the officer's position and the person's 
special interest in receiving such communication, are absolutely privi-
(2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 396, affd. per curiam 275 U.S. 503 (1927). See, generally, PROSSER, 
TORTS, 2d ed., §95 (1955). With regard to the privilege of military and naval officers, see 
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, [1869] 5 Q.B. 94; Miles v. McGrath, (D.C. Md. 1933) 4 F. Supp. 
603. But see Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880); 3 TORTS REsrATEMENT §591, com-
ment d, caveat, where the ALI takes no position on "military and naval officers of the 
States or Nation who perform important governmental functions." 
10 161 U.S. 483 (1896). 
11 Spalding v. Vilas, note 7 supra, at 498. The Court approved the English rule and 
cited the leading English decisions. 
12 See 3 TORTS REsrATEMENT §591, comment d (1938); Veeder, "Absolute Immunity in 
Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings," 10 CoL. L. R.Ev. 131 at 141 (1910). 
18 DeAmaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167 (1904) (colonel in army); Newbury v. 
Love, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 372 (federal personnel officer); Taylor v. Glotfelty, (6th 
Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d) 51 (psychiatrist at federal prison); Papagianakis v. The Samos, (4th 
Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 257 (immigration officials); Harwood v. McMurtry, (W.D. Ky. 1938) 
22 F. Supp. 572 (internal revenue agent); Smith v. O'Brien, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 88 F. (2d) 
769 (chairman of federal tariff commission); U.S. to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, (D.C. 
Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 383 (Consul); Brown v. Rudolph, (D.C. Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 540 
(District of Columbia commissioners); Yaselli v. Goff, note 9 supra (assistant attorney 
general); Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D.C. 413 (1912) (Commissioner of Indian Affairs). But 
see Nalle v. Oyster, note 8 supra; National Disabled Soldiers' League v. Haan, note 8 
supra. Supporting state court decisions are Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. (2d) 
892 (1952); Catron v. Jasper, 303 Ky. 598, 198 S.W. (2d) 322 (1946); Powers v. Vaughn, 312 
Mich. 297, 20 N.W. (2d) 196 (1945); Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio 574, 37 N.E. (2d) 584 
(1941); Layne v. Kirby, 208 Cal. 694, 284 P. 441 (1930). Contra: Barry v. McCollum, 81 
Conn. 293, 70 A. 1035 (1908); In re Investigating Comm., 16 Rl. 751, 11 A. 429 (1887). 
14 DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, note 13 supra; Taylor v. Glotfelty, note 13 supra; U.S. to 
Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, note 13 supra; Farr v. Valentine, note 13 supra. Courts 
have varied in their opinions as to how relevant the statement must be to the report, 
some requiring only a remote connection between the two. See, generally, comment, 20 
UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 677 (1953); note, 51 MICH. L. REv. 457 (1953). 
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leged.15 A third type of communication for which a few federal officers 
have received protection is the press release.16 The principal case, in addi-
tion to being the first word from the Supreme Court on executive absolute 
privilege since Spalding, is the first time an executive official other than a 
cabinet member has been accorded this privilege in issuing a press release.17 
While the according of absolute privilege to press releases issued by the 
heads of executive departments perhaps can be justified because of the policy-
making character of their duties and their direct responsibility to the 
President,18 it is difficult to see why more than a qualified privilege19 is 
needed in the case of lesser officials.20 Since privileges of this nature rest 
on the demands of public policy, a balancing of interests is necessarily 
involved.21 The interests to be balanced are, first, the interest of the private 
individual in maintaining his reputation and, second, the public interest 
in having government officials carry out their functions without fear of law-
suits.22 Even if this balancing requires the complete subordination of the 
private interest through the use of absolute privilege where official reports 
are involved, the balance is not the same in the case of press releases.23 The 
danger of injury to individual reputations in applying absolute privilege 
to internal and special government communications is minimized by the 
fact that the person authorized to receive it is likely to have sufficient 
knowledge of the matter to be able to judge its truth and reasonableness 
for himself. On the other hand, the press release reaches a large segment 
of the public which may be unfamiliar with the situation and is, therefore, 
15 Smith v. O'Brien, note 13 supra; Newbury v. Love, note 13 supra; Howard v. Lyons, 
note 5 supra, companion: to the principal case, is of this type. See, generally, 132 A.L.R. 
1340 (1941). 
16 Mellon v. Brewer, (D.C. Cir. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 168 (Secretary of Treasury's letter to 
President released to press); Glass v. Ickes, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 117 F. (2d) 273 (Secretary of 
Interior's statements to press about former government lawyer). See also Grant v. Secretary 
of State for India, (1877] 2 C.P .D. 445; Matson v. Margiotti, note 13 supra. But see Colpoys 
v. Gates, note 8 supra (U.S. marshal refused absolute privilege); Murray v. Brancato, note 
8 supra (judge's opinion not protected by absolute privilege when voluntarily submitted 
for publication). 
17 See Colpoys v. Gates, note 8 supra; Mellon v. Brewer, note 16 supra; Glass v. 
Ickes, note 16 supra. But see Matson v. Margiotti, note 13 supra, where a press release 
of a communication from the state attorney general to a district attorney was treated as 
absolutely privileged despite the fact the press release occurred prior to delivery of the 
actual communication. 
18 See Spalding v. Vilas, note 7 supra; Mellon v. Brewer, note 16 supra; Glass v. Ickes, 
note 16 supra. See also the opinion of Chief Justice Warren, joined loy Justice Douglas, 
dissenting in the principal case at 578. 
19 See note 6 supra. 
20 See Colpoys v. Gates, note 8 supra; dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, principal 
case at 586. See also I HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 420, 429 (1956). 
21 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 607 (1955). 
22 Principal case at 571-572. But see the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, 
principal case at 578, where at 584 he states that the Court balanced the wrong interests 
and that the Court should have considered the public interest in criticizing government 
without the fear of a libelous retort. 
23 See, generally, comment, 20 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 677 (1953); note, 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
457 (1953). 
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in a poor position to judge the truth or falsity of the statements it contains. 
Second, the larger circulation of press releases means a greater probability 
of damage to individual reputation and greater actual damage to reputation 
when defamation occurs.24 Third, it is doubtful that press releases are as 
necessary to or promote the functioning of the government to the same 
extent as the other two types of communications.25 Finally, press releases 
provide a far more effective means by which the unscrupulous self-seeking 
official can effectuate his purpose than either of the other two means.2 6 In 
light of these considerations, the private individual should be protected at 
least to the extent he can show malice and lack of good faith on the part 
of the offender. It thus appears that the Court in the principal case has 
extended the doctrine of absolute privilege beyond the demands of the 
policy it purports to effectuate. 
James S. Leigh, S.Ed. 
24 Reputation of the individual is the interest protected in the law of defamation. See 
ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER, 6th ed., 187 (1929); 1 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 429 (1956). 
25 Many of the press releases are copies of other types of intergovernmental communi-
cations which are protected in the first instance by absolute privilege anyway. See, e.g., 
Mellon v. Brewer, note 16 supra; Matson v. Margiotti, note 13 supra; Murray v. Brancato, 
note 8 supra. 
26 The fact situations in many of these cases suggest motives other than the furtherance 
of the public interest in the issuance of the release, See comment, 20 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 
677 (1953). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Stewart, principal case at 592. See, 
generally, I HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 429 (1956). In view of our ever expanding govern-
ment agencies it would seem increasingly dangerous to make liberal use of an absolute 
privilege for press releases issued by lower federal officers. 
